

## Overview on Formal Verification

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## Outline

- State of the art in Formal Verification
- Ingredients in Formal Verification
- Classification


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
## Simulation: The Current Picture



- Hard to generate high quality input stimuli
  - A lot of user effort
  - No formal way to identify unexercised aspects
- No good measure of comprehensiveness of validation
  - Low bug detection rate is the main criterion
  - Only means that current method of stimulus generation is not achieving more.

## Formal Verification: An Alternative to Simulation!

- Formal Verification is the process of constructing a proof that a target system will behave in accordance with its specification
  - Use of *mathematical reasoning* to prove that an implementation satisfies a specification
  - Like a mathematical proof: correctness of a formally verified hardware design holds *regardless of input values*
  - Consideration of *all cases is implicit* in formal verification
- Must establish
  - A formal *specification* (properties or high-level behavior)
  - A formal description of the *implementation* (design at higher level of abstraction — *model* (observationally) equivalent to implementation or implied by implementation).



### Formal Verification: Pros

- Complete with respect to a given property
- Correctness guaranteed mathematically, regardless the input values
- No need to generate expected output sequences
- Can generate an error trace if a property fails: better understand, confirm by simulation
- Formal verification useful to detect and locate errors in designs
- Consideration of *all cases is implicit* in formal verification

### Formal Verification: Cons

- Just because we have proved something correct does not mean it will work!
- Common to other techniques
  - Does the **specification** actually capture the designer's intentions?
  - Does the **implementation** in the real world behave like the model?
- Scalability (with the size of the design to verify)

### Simulation vs. Formal Verification (1/4)

#### ➤ Example

- $(x+1)^2 = x^2 + 2x + 1$

#### ➤ Simulation

- Check Equation for all Values!!!

x	$(x+1)^2$	$x^2 + 2x + 1$
0	1	1
1	4	4
2	9	9
3	16	16
9	100	100
67	4624	4624
...	...	...

### Simulation vs. Formal Verification (2/4)

#### ➤ Formal Proof

1.	$(x+1)^2 = x^2 + 2x + 1$	definition of square
2.	$(x+1)(x+1) = (x+1)x + (x+1)1$	distributivity
3.	$(x+1)^2 = (x+1)x + (x+1)1$	substitution of 2. in 1.
4.	$(x+1)1 = x+1$	neutral element 1
5.	$(x+1)x = xx + 1x$	distributivity
6.	$(x+1)^2 = xx + 1x + x + 1$	substitution of 4. and 5. in 3.
7.	$1x = x$	neutral element 1
8.	$(x+1)^2 = xx + x + x + 1$	substitution of 7. in 6.
9.	$xx = x^2$	definition of square
10.	$x + x = 2x$	definition of 2x
11.	$(x+1)^2 = x^2 + 2x + 1$	substitution of 9. and 10. in 8.

### Simulation vs. Formal Verification (3/4)

- Simulation: **complete** (real) **model** **partial verification**
- Verification: **partial** (abstract) **model**, **complete verification**
- Simulation still needed to tune specifications; for large complete designs
- Verification can generate counter-examples (error traces); possibly false negatives!
- Techniques are complementary — formal verification gives additional confidence, e.g.,
  - Apply formal verification of abstract model
  - Obtain error trace if bug found (may be false negative!)
  - Simulate error trace on the real model

### Simulation vs. Formal Verification (4/4)

#### ➤ Common difficulty in all verification methods:

- Lack of “golden” reference
  - What properties to verify
- “Simulation and formal verification have to play together.”

[IEEE Spectrum, January 1996]

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## State of the Art (1/3)

- In the 1960-70's, high expectations for "software verification", but hopes gradually fizzled out by the late 1970's
- Theorem proving approaches have "cultural roots" in software verification in 1970's (Hoare, Owicki, Gries)
- The use of formal methods did not seem practical
  - Notations too obscure
  - Techniques did not scale with problem size
  - Tool support inadequate or too hard to use
  - Only a few non-trivial case studies available
  - Few people had the necessary training

## State of the Art (2/3)

- Why formal methods might work well for "hardware verification"?
  - Hardware is often regular and hierarchical
  - Re-use of design is common practice
  - Hardware specification is more common, e.g., VHDL models
  - Primitives are simpler, e.g., behavior of an NAND-Gate easier to describe than the
  - Semantics of a while-loop
  - Cost of design error can mean a 6 months delay and a costly set of lithography masks

## State of the Art (3/3)

- Recently more promising picture
  - Software specification: industry trying out notations like SDL or Z to document system's properties
  - Protocol verification successful
  - Hardware verification: industry adopting model checking and some theorem proving to complement simulation
  - Industrial case studies increasing confidence in using formal methods
  - Verification groups: *IBM, Intel, Motorola, HP, Nortel, NEC, Fujitsu, SUN, Cadence, Siemens, Synopsys, Lucent Technologies, .....*
  - Commercial tools from: *Chrysalis, Cadence, Synopsys, Verysys, IBM, .....*

## Formal Verification Methods

- Interactive (deductive) Methods
  - **Theorem Proving**: relationship between a specification and an implementation is a theorem in a logic, to be proven within the context of a proof calculus
- Automated Methods
  - **Combinational Equivalence Checking**: proof of structural equivalence of logic designs
  - **Sequential Equivalence Checking**: proof of behavioral equivalence of FSMs
  - **Model Checking**: proof of (temporal) logic property (safety & liveness) against a semantic model of the design
  - **Invariant Checking** (safety property)
  - **Language Containment** (model checking of automata)

## Formal Specification (1/2)

- A *specification* is a description of a system and its desired properties
- Useful as a communication device
  - between customer and designer,
  - between designer and implementor, and
  - between implementors and tester
- Companion document to the system's source code, but at a higher level of abstraction
- Properties relate to **function**, interfaces, timing, performance, power, layout, etc.

## Formal Specification (2/2)


- **Formal specification.** Use of formal methods (a **language** with mathematically-defined **syntax** and **semantics**) to describe the intended behavior of the system:
  - The language of logic provides an unambiguous method of recording the specification
  - We can reason about a formal specification to check that the system specified will possess other desired properties
- The process of writing a formal specification helps uncover ambiguity and incompleteness
- Formal specifications most successful for functional behavior, also interface & timing
- Trend to integrate different specification languages, each for a different aspect (e.g. VERA, SystemC, VHDL+)

## Types of properties (2/2)

- Functional correctness properties;
- Safety (invariant) and Liveness properties  
E.g.: in a mutual exclusion system with two processes A and B
  - **Safety property** (nothing bad will ever happen): e.g. simultaneous access will never be granted to both A and B. If false, can be detected by finite sequences
  - **Liveness property** (something good will eventually happen): e.g. if A wants to enter its critical section, it will eventually do so. Can only be proved false by infinite sequences (any finite sequence can be extended to satisfy the eventuality condition)

## Types of properties (2/2)

- **Invariant property:**  $Gp$ , Globally Property  $p$  holds, i.e.,  $\text{not}(p)$  is never reached,  $\text{not}(E(\text{not}(p)))$



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
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## Equivalence Checking (1/3)

- If same state variables
  - *Combinational Equivalence* of  $\delta$  and  $\lambda$
  - *Difficulty strongly dependent from the Boolean function representation (canonical vs. non canonical)*
- If state space different
  - *State Enumeration by Reachability Analysis*
  - Two FSMs are equivalent if they produce the same output for every possible input sequence — *Sequential Equivalence Checking*

## Equivalence Checking (2/3)




### Equivalence Checking (3/3)

- **Combinational equivalence**
  - Possible if one-to-one state mapping do exist
  - Relatively straightforward (equivalence of sets of functions (BDDs))
  - Tools part of verification flow
- **Sequential equivalence**
  - Needs some sort of **Reachability Analysis**
  - No state mapping required (building of product machine)
  - Hard to handle large circuits (also must consider all initial states) because of the **state explosion problem**

### Model Checking (1/3)

- **Property** described by temporal logic formula.
- System modeled by Labeled Transition Graph (LTG, LTS, *Finite Kripke structure*).
- *Exhaustive* search through the state space of the system (*Reachability Analysis*) to determine if the property holds (provides counterexamples for identifying design errors).
- Problem: “State explosion”
- Partial Solution: Symbolic Model Checking
- Represent transition/output relations and sets of states symbolically using ROBDD
- Alternative methods based on Satisfiability Solvers

### Model Checking (2/3)



### Model Checking (3/3)

